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RELEASING ACCUSED GENOCIDAL PERPETRATORS IN RWANDA:
THE DISPLACEMENT OF PREVENTIVE JUSTICE
George S. Yacoubian, Jr., Ph.D.t
Introduction
In addition to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR"),1 es-
tablished by the United Nations ("UN") during the early 1990s to prosecute indi-
viduals accused of committing genocide and other crimes against humanity, the
Rwandan government has also prosecuted accused genocidal perpetrators for
their alleged participation in the 1994 Rwandan Genocide. To date, the ICTR
has prosecuted and convicted twenty offenders, while national Rwandan authori-
ties have prosecuted approximately 200 offenders, 2 and another 80,000 persons
are still awaiting trial in Rwanda. 3 Unfortunately, the unmanageable quantity of
accused offenders awaiting trial before the national courts has forced authorities
to release thousands of detainees in an effort to ease prison overcrowding. 4 By
any objective standard, this is an unsatisfactory resolution to the Rwandan Geno-
cide since the prevention of genocide is partly contingent on the successful prose-
cution and punishment of perpetrators. 5 As a result, the international community
is now at a greater risk of succumbing to new genocidal events.
A review of the situation in Rwanda and the current state of international crim-
inal law suggests that there may be alternative solutions that could balance the
practical quagmire of prison overcrowding and the need to bring genocidal per-
petrators to justice. Part I of this essay provides a brief historical assessment of
genocide in the Twentieth Century. Part II summarizes the events that
culminated in the 1994 Rwandan Genocide and reviews the investigations and
prosecutions conducted to date at the ICTR and in Rwanda. Part III presents a
history of the International Criminal Court ("ICC"),6 established in the summer
of 2002, and reviews the work undertaken by the ICC to date. Part IV discusses
f George S. Yacoubian, Jr., is an associate research scientist with the Pacific Institute for Re-
search Evaluation (PIRE) in Calverton, MD. The author would like to thank Roger S. Clark, Board of
Governors Professor at Rutgers (Camden) School of Law, for his review of an earlier draft of this paper.
The author has written extensively in the area of genocide and international criminal justice. Address
correspondence to: Dr. George S. Yacoubian, Jr., PIRE, 11710 Beltsville Drive, Suite 300, Calverton,
MD, 20705, (301) 755-2790, (301) 755-2799 - Fax, or by email to gyacoubian@pire.org.
I S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1168 (Nov. 8, 1994).
2 Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 2005 (Amnesty Int'l. 2005), available at
http://web.amnesty.org/report2005/rwa-summary-eng.
3 Rwanda to Speed up Genocide Trials, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Jan. 17, 2005, available at
http://www.smh.com.au/news/World/Rwanda-to-speed-up-genocide-uials/2005/01/16/1105810774432.
html (last visited Jan. 19, 2006).
4 Press Release, Amnesty International, Rwanda: End of Provisional Release of Genocide Suspects
(Apr. 23, 2003), available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAFR470052003.
5 LEO KUPER, THE PREVENTION OF GENOCIDE 193-94 (1985).
6 See generally International Criminal Court, http://www.icc-cpi.int/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2006).
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the problems and potential alternative solutions to the Rwandan prison over-
crowding and the impact that the release of accused genocidal perpetrators will
have on the international community. A thoughtful analysis of these alternatives
suggests that releasing thousands of suspected genocidal perpetrators for the sole
purpose of easing prison overcrowding is an inadequate resolution to a criminal
phenomenon that has consistently plagued the global community for the past
century.
I. Genocide
The Armenian Massacres of 1915 are widely considered to be the first princi-
pal genocide of the Twentieth Century.7 During the second half of the nineteenth
century, Armenia fell under Ottoman Turk rule.8 In 1908, the Young Turks, the
ruling political party of the Ottoman Empire that was comprised of army of-
ficers, 9 adopted a credo of pan-Turanism, which alleged a mythic unity among
Turanian peoples based on the concept of 'Turkification."o Motivated by a fe-
verish sense of jingoism, the Young Turks sought an empire that stretched from
central Asia to China.1 Between 1908 and 1914, the seemingly democratic
Young Turks became xenophobic nationalists intent on eliminating the Armenian
people.12
By the end of April 1915, the stage had been set for the Armenian Massacres.
Men, women, and children were led to secluded areas and murdered. 13 Those
who were not killed immediately were killed as a result of the conditions sur-
rounding the Ottoman deportation orders. 14 As Dadrian stated, "the Ottoman
authorities ordered ... the wholesale deportation of the Armenian population of
the empire's Eastern and Southeastern provinces."' 5 By the time the killings
ceased, more than one and a half million Armenians had been slaughtered.16
At the time of the Armenian Massacres, neither the crime nor the definition of
genocide had been conceptualized. As I have written, "[t]here were certain rules
of war to protect civilian populations, but these regulations failed to cover a gov-
7 See generally JAY WINTER ET AL., AMERICA AND THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE OF 1915 (Jay Winter
ed., 2004); SAMANArA POWER, "A PROBLEM FROM HELL" AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE 1-16
(2002); VAHArN N. DADRIAN, THE HISTORY OF THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE (Berghan Books 6th rev. ed.
2003).
8 DADRIAN, supra note 7, at 45.
9 Id. at 45.
10 JOSEF GUTrMANN, THE BEGINNINGS OF GENOCIDE (Armenian Historical Research Assn. 1965).
11 DADRIAN, supra note 7, at 185.
12 Id. at 180-184.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 DADRIAN, supra note 7, at 219.
16 DADRIAN, supra note 7, at xiviii.
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emiment's persecution of its own people." 17 Rather, France, Great Britain, and
Russia referred to the Armenian Massacres as "crimes against humanity."' 18
The term "genocide" was ultimately coined and defined in 1944 by Raphael
Lemkin, a Polish-Jewish jurist, to denote "a coordinated plan of different actions
aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups,
with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves." 19  Lemkin's efforts
culminated in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, 20 which officially came into effect as a binding piece of international
law on January 12, 1951.21 Today, 137 states have ratified or acceded to the
Convention, including all member states of the European Union and all perma-
nent members of the UN Security Council ("SC").22 Article II of the Genocide
Convention defines genocide as:
Any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole
or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such:
a) Killing members of the group;
b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
and
e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 23
No state has ever asserted that genocide is not a crime, and the definition
contained in Article II is considered to be binding international law. 24
Despite the ratification of the Genocide Convention and an increased aware-
ness of the potential for unparalleled destruction since the end of the Second
World War, genocide has been perpetrated repeatedly during the past four de-
cades. I have observed that "its contemporary manifestation has indicated a ca-
17 George Yacoubian, Underestimating the Magnitude of International Crime: Implications of Geno-
cidal Behavior for the Discipline of Criminology, 14 WORLD BULL. 23 (1998), available at http://www.
habermas.org/yacoubiandoc.htm.
18 Roger S. Clark, Crimes Against Humanity, in THE NUREMBERG TRIAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
177 (George Ginsburg & V.N. Kudriavtsev eds. 1990).
19 RAPHAEL LEMKIN, Axis RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE: LAWS OF OCCUPATION - ANALYSIS OF Gov-
ERNMENT - PROPOSALS FOR REDRESS 79 (1944).
20 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, G.A. Res. 260 (1II), U.N.
GAOR, 3rd Sess., 179th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 9, 1948) [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
21 University of Minnesota: Human Rights Library, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (Jan. 12, 1951), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/
instree/x lcppcg.htm.
22 See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Convention on the Pre-
vention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/1.
htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2006).
23 Genocide Convention, supra note 20, at 174.
24 EDWARD M. WISE, ELLEN S. PODGOR & ROGER S. CLARK, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW CASES
AND MATERIALS 690 (2d ed. 2004).
Volume 3, Issue 1 Loyola University Chicago International Law Review 23
Releasing Accused Genocidal Perpetrators in Rwanda
pacity for atrocity on an unprecedented scale. '25 Victimized groups include
400,000 civilians during the Vietnam War,26 more than one million Bengalis in
Bangladesh in 1971,27 150,000 Hutu in Burundi in 1972,28 1.5 million Cambodi-
ans between 1975 and 1979,29 200,000 Bosnian Muslims and Croats in the For-
mer Yugoslavia in 1992,30 and 800,000 Tutsi in Rwanda in 1994.31 It was the
genocidal events that took place in Rwanda that ultimately yielded legal re-
sponses in the form of both national prosecutions and the creation of an interna-
tional criminal tribunal. 32
II. Rwanda
The popular but dangerously simplistic version of Rwanda's catastrophe is
that tribal rivalry led to an eruption of savagery. This description erroneously
allows the international community to dismiss not only its complexity, but also
its significance in the development of international criminal law. The events in
Rwanda illustrate how the coexistence of different social groups can evolve into
problems with overwhelmingly racial dimensions. As Destexhe affirmed,
"archaic political divisions were progressively transformed into racial ideologies
... which then brought them into the political arena." 33
During the second decade of the Twentieth Century, Germany colonized the
region in Africa that now encompasses Rwanda and Burundi. 34 Three ethnic
groups inhabited the area: the Twa, the original denizens comprising one percent
of the population; the Hutu, who entered the area during the fourth and seventh
centuries comprising eighty-five percent of the population; and the Tutsi, the
newest inhabitants, comprising fourteen percent of the population.35 Belgium
25 George Yacoubian, The Efficacy of International Criminal Justice: Evaluating the Aftermath of the
Rwandan Genocide, 161 WORLD AFFAIRS 186, 186 (1999).
26 GUENTER LEwY, AMERICA IN VIETNAM 443 (1978).
27 FRANK CHALK & KURT JONASSOHN, THE HISTORY AND SOCIOLOGY OF GENOCIDE 396 (Yale U.
Press 1990); LEo KUPER, GENOCIDE: ITS POLrTCAL USE IN THE TwENTIm CENTURY 79 (1981).
28 LEO KUPER, THE PITY OF IT ALL: POLARISATION OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC RELATIONS 91 (1977).
29 George Yacoubian, Countdown to a Permanent International Criminal Court- Toward a Rap-
prochement of the Cambodian Genocide, 1 J. STUDY PEACE & CONFLICT 4 (1999); Ben Kiernan, The
Cambodian Genocide: Issues and Responses, in GENOCIDE: CONCEPTUAL AND HISTORICAL DIMENSIONS
191-228 (G. J. Andreopolus ed., U. Pa. Press 1994).
30 M. CHERJF BASSIOUNI, The Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Reso-
lution 780: Investigating Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia, in
THE PROSECUTION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 11, n.28 (1996).
31 LINDA MELVERN, CONSPIRACY TO MURDER: THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE 250 (2004); ALAIN
DESTEXHE, RWANDA AND GENOCIDE IN THE TwENTIETH CENTURY (1995); GERARD PRUNIER, THE
RWANDA CRISIS: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE 1959-1994 265 (1995); See generally Jean Mukimbiri, The
Seven Stages of the Rwandan Genocide, 3 J INT'L. CRIM. JUST. 823 (2005).
32 WISE ET AL., supra note 24, at 570; see also S.C. Res. 955, supra note 1, para. 1.
33 DESTEXHE, supra note 31, at 47.
34 PRUNIER, supra note 31, at 23-26.
35 DESTEXHE, supra note 31, at 37.
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annexed the colonies after the First World War, when the Tutsi were the more
dominant group, despite larger numbers of Hutu. 36
Three years before Rwanda gained independence from Belgium, in 1962, a
Hutu uprising resulted in the deaths of more than 20,000 Tutsi refugees who were
fleeing the country for Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, and the Congo. 37 The Belgi-
ans, responding to pressures for democratization within its colonies, supported
the Hutu.38 Although evidence suggests animosity between the Hutu and Tutsi
began prior to Belgian rule, colonial intervention greatly exacerbated these diffi-
culties. 39 Ethnic tensions heightened due to the favoritism of the Tutsi by the
Belgians throughout their colonial rule and because of their subsequent support
of the Hutu coup.40 This ultimately created conditions that expedited the path
toward genocide.41
The Hutu party, led by General Juvenal Habyarimana, came to power through
a military coup in 1973.42 For the next twenty years, Hutu rule dominated
Rwanda.43 Although Habyarimana claimed to have established a nation of bal-
anced resources and job distribution, the President and his National Revolution
Movement for Democracy and Development ruled Rwanda as a one-party state. 44
The new government initially sought to accommodate the Tutsi, giving them a
place in Rwandan society in proportion to their population (fourteen percent). 45
This transition meant quotas throughout the government and the economy.
Throughout Habyarimana's rule, Rwandan Tutsi in neighboring countries tried to
return to their homeland, but the Rwandan government denied repatriation. 46
Then, in the fall of 1990, the Rwandan Patriotic Front, which consisted of Tutsi
who had fled Rwanda years before, entered northern Rwanda from Uganda.47
They now demanded democracy and power sharing from what they claimed was
a corrupt Habyarimana regime. 48
Though several concessions were made to the Tutsi rebels, the government's
more extreme Hutu elements became increasingly organized and the government
took steps to consolidate their power.49 In response to the overwhelming politi-
cal frustration, Tutsi rebels attacked President Habyarimana's airplane on April
36 Id. at 40.
37 Id. at 78.
38 Id. at 43.
39 Id. at 41.
40 PRUNIER, supra note 31, at 26-35.
41 Id.
42 DESTEXHE, supra note 31, at 45.
43 Id.
44 PRUNIER, supra note 31, at 76-79.
45 Id.
46 DESTEXRE, supra note 31, at 46.
47 PRUNIER, supra note 31, at 90-94.
48 DESTEXHE, supra note 31, at 45.
49 Id. at 46.
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6, 1994.50 Everyone on board was killed.51 The annihilation of all Tutsi began
instantaneously. 52 By July, Hutu soldiers, police officers, and militia members,
recurrently aided by civilians, killed approximately 800,000 Tutsi in several well-
coordinated waves of mass killing.5 3
Ill. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR")
The crisis in Rwanda was initially interpreted as a humanitarian catastrophe
affecting hundreds of thousands of refugees, and eliciting international compas-
sion. Surprisingly, the crisis failed to give due attention to the genocide that had
already run its course. As Destexhe observed, "humanitarian action provided a
way of responding to the crisis while continuing to conveniently overlook the
fact that genocide had taken place until the situation had evolved to the point
where it could be forgotten altogether. '54 In a belated response to the atrocities,
the SC established a Commission of Experts in July 1994 to investigate viola-
tions of international humanitarian law in Rwanda. 55 In its first interim report,
the Commission concluded that there was evidence of genocide as defined by the
Genocide Convention.56 Having confirmed that genocide and other flagrant vio-
lations of international humanitarian law had been committed, the SC established
the ICTR 57 in 1994.58
The international community has traditionally relied on five ways of respond-
ing to violations of international criminal law: (1) doing nothing; (2) granting
amnesty; (3) creating a truth commission; (4) foreign prosecutions; and (5) creat-
ing ad hoc international tribunals. 59 The Genocide Convention states that, "per-
sons charged with genocide.., shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State
in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal
tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which
shall have accepted its jurisdiction. ' 60 Therefore, three options exist to prosecute
accused genocidal perpetrators in Rwanda. Domestic officials can prosecute in-
dividuals accused of genocidal behavior internally, a foreign state can intervene
50 Id. at 31.
51 MELVERN, supra note 31, at 133-136; MICHAEL BARNETT, EYEWITNESS TO A GENOCIDE: THE
UNITED NATIONS AND RWANDA 95 (2003).
52 DESTEXE, supra note 31, at 31.
53 MELVERN, supra note 31, at 164-220.
54 DESTEXRE, supra note 31, at 58.
55 BARNETT, supra note 51, at 142-152; MELVERN, supra note 31, at 248-249.
56 Id.
57 S.C. Res. 955, supra note 1.
58 Id.
59 See generally M. CHERiF BASSIOUNt, The Prosecution of International Crimes and the Establish-
ment of an International Criminal Court, in 3 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, 3-11 (M. Cherif Bassiouni
ed., 2d ed. 1999).
60 Genocide Convention, supra note 20, at Art. VI.
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and prosecute an accused perpetrator, 61 or the United Nations can convene an ad
hoc criminal tribunal. To date, four such international ad hoc criminal tribunals
have convened: the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in 1945,62 the
International Military Tribunal for the Far East at Tokyo in 1946,63 the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia at The Hague in 1992,64 and
the ICTR.
65
The creation of the ICTR supported Rwandan efforts to allocate individual
responsibility for genocide and other crimes against humanity by offering an ob-
jective forum for investigating genocidal events. 66 The SC decided to create the
ICTR to bring to justice those persons responsible for acts of genocide and viola-
tions of humanitarian law in Rwanda between January 1 and December 31,
1994.67 As such, the ICTR is authorized to prosecute four clusters of offenses:
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, violations of the laws or customs of
war, the crime of genocide, and crimes against humanity. 68
The first trial at the ICTR started in January 1997.69 Fifty persons have been
indicted to date.70 As of March 2005, there have been seventeen judgments
against twenty-three accused perpetrators. 7 1 Twenty of the twenty-three accused
(eighty-seven percent) were convicted, including one prime minister, four minis-
ters, one prefect, five burgomasters and several others who held leadership posi-
tions in 1994.72 Eight trials were in progress as of March 2005, involving a total
61 While the Genocide Convention does not specifically permit foreign states to prosecute accused
genocidal perpetrators, foreign states can assume jurisdiction via the principle of universal jurisdiction.
Universal jurisdiction is criminal jurisdiction based solely on the nature of the crime, without regard to
where the crime was committed, the nationality of the alleged perpetrator, the nationality of the victim, or
any other connection to the state exercising the jurisdiction. Universal jurisdiction can be exercised by a
competent judicial body of any state to prosecute a person accused of committing a serious crime under
international law, like genocide. See CrimC (Jer) 40161 Israel v. Eichman [1962] IsrsC [5](1-70) (dis-
cussing a brief history and application of universal jurisdiction against a defendant prosecuted for assist-
ing the Nazi regime in genocide outside of Israeli borders).
62 The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg was established pursuant to the Agreement for
the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 82
U.N.T.S. 279, available at http://wwwl.umn.edulhumanrts/instree/imtl945.htm.
63 Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Special Proclamation by the Su-
preme Commander for the Allied Powers at Tokyo, 19 Jan. 1946, available at http://www.yale.edu/law
web/avalon/imtfech.htm (giving full text of the Tribunal's Constitution).
64 S.C. Res. 808, U.N. Doec. S/RES/808 (Feb. 22, 1993).
65 S.C. Res. 955, supra note 1.
66 Erik Mose, Main Achievements of the ICTR, 3 J. INT'L. CRIM. JUST. 920, 939-40 (2005); George
Yacoubian, Evaluating the Efficacy of the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the Former
Yugoslavia: Implications for Criminology and International Criminal Law, 3 WORLD AFFAIRS 133, 135
(2002).
67 Payam Akhavan, The International Criminal Tribunalfor Rwanda: The Politics and Pragmatics of
Punishment, 90 AM. J. INT'L. L. 501, 502 (1996).
68 Id. at 502-3.
69 See International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, http://www.ictr.orglENGLISHlfactsheets/de-
tainee.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2006).
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
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of twenty-five accused, including eight ministers, one parliamentarian, two
prefects, three burgomasters, one councilor, and three military officers. 73
Trials in Rwanda
In December 1996, the genocide prosecutions in Rwanda began. 74 To date,
Rwandese courts have concluded approximately 200 trials, with an additional
80,000 suspected perpetrators still awaiting trial.75 Not surprisingly, the sheer
magnitude of genocide cases has placed a severe strain on Rwanda's criminal
justice system. 76 That said, general amnesty was out of the question at the time
the prosecutions began because the new government, the Rwandan people, and
the international community believed that "those responsible for the genocide
should be held accountable for their acts in order to eradicate the culture of impu-
nity, reinforce respect for the law and uphold the principle of punishment for
crimes. '77 Because the possibility of amnesty had been dismissed, national au-
thorities attempted to ease the pressure by categorizing the detainees according to
the crimes for which they were accused and adopted an alternative justice sys-
tem-the Gacaca institution.78
National Rwandese officials created four categories of people accused of ge-
nocide.79 Category One consists of the "planners, organisers, and framers of ge-
nocide or crimes against humanity."80 Category Two includes persons who
committed homicide or attempted homicide. 81 Category Three includes persons
who committed "serious attacks without the intent to cause the death of the vic-
tims."'82 Category Four includes "crimes against property. '83
The Gacaca law was adopted in March 2001.84 The law gives a role to the
community in the trial and sentencing process because the Government believes
that community involvement can contribute significantly to reconciliation. 85 The
primary principle of the Gacaca courts is to bring together all parties (i.e., perpe-
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Rwanda to Speed up Genocide Trials, supra note 3.
76 See id.
77 Penal Reform International, Gacaca Courts in Rwanda, http://www.penalreform.org/english/theme
gacaca.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2006).
78 See Mark A. Drumbl, Lecture, Law and Atrocity: Settling Accounts in Rwanda, 31 Ohwo N.U. L.
REv. 41, 55 (2005).
79 William A. Schabas, Genocide Trials and Gacaca Courts, 3 J. INT'L. CRIM. JUST. 879, 892-93
(2005); Gacaca Courts in Rwanda, supra note 77; see also Jacques Fierens, Gacaca Courts: Between
Fantasy and Reality, 3 J. INT'L. CRIM. JUST. 896, 909-10 (2005) (discussing how Article 51 of Organic
Law no. 16/2004 of June 19, 2004 redefined the different categories of alleged perpetrators for the third
time, after the laws of 1996 and 2001).
80 Schabas, supra note 79, at 893.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 891-92; see also Gacaca Courts in Rwanda, supra note 77.
85 See Gacaca Courts in Rwanda, supra note 77.
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trators, victims, and witnesses) at the location of the crime for the purposes of
establishing the truth and identifying the guilty. 86 The inyangamugayo, or non-
professional judges elected from the community, will chair the proceedings. 87
These judges are also responsible for imposing the sentences on those
convicted.88
There are four primary advantages to the Gacaca institution: (1) an expedited
process, which should provide closure to victims, offenders, and the international
community and begin to foster national reconciliation; (2) the reduction of prison
maintenance costs, enabling the government to concentrate on more pressing
needs; (3) the participation of every member of the community, facilitating the
establishment of the truth; and (4) innovative criminal justice methods created by
the new courts particularly with sentencing and community reintegration. 89 Un-
fortunately, the establishment of the Gacaca jurisdictions has been delayed until
2006.90 Contributing to the problem of judicial resolution to the genocide of
1994 is the release of 36,000 suspected genocidal perpetrators during the summer
of 2005 to reduce prison overcrowding. 91 This is an unsatisfactory resolution to
one of the most horrific genocidal events of the Twentieth Century. The prosecu-
tion and punishment of accused perpetrators of genocide is necessary to achieve
global justice and peace. 92 By not punishing perpetrators of genocide, the inter-
national community is now at a greater risk of succumbing to new genocidal
events.
IV. International Criminal Court
The international legal community worked toward the creation of a permanent
international criminal court for most of the Twentieth Century. 93 The goal of
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 See Rwanda to Speed up Genocide Trials, supra note 3.
91 See Integrated Regional Information Networks, Rwanda: Release of thousands of prisoners begins,
Aug. 1, 2005, http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportlD=48373 (last visited Mar. 2, 2006).
92 See HOWARD BALL, PROSECUTING WAR CRIMES AND GENOCIDE: THE TWENTIETH CENTURY EXPE-
RIENCE 214 (1999).
93 See Elizabeth Chadwick, A Tale of Two Courts: The 'Creation' of a Jurisdiction?, 9 J. CONFLICT
& SEC. L. 71, 72 (2004); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Policy Perspectives Favoring the Establishment of the
International Criminal Court, 52 J. INT'L. AFFAIRS 795, 795-96 (1999); Bryan F. MacPherson, Building
an International Criminal Court for the 21st Century, 13 CONN. J. INT'L. L. 1, 4-14 (1998); M. Cherif
Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The Need to Establish a Permanent Inter-
national Criminal Court, 10 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 11, 49-57 (1997); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Establishing an
International Criminal Court: Historical Survey, 149 Mi.. L. REV. 49, 50-53 (1995); M. Cherif Bas-
siouni & Christopher L. Blakesley, The Need for an International Criminal Court in the New Interna-
tional World Order, 25 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 151, 152-58 (1992); Benjamin B. Ferencz, An
International Criminal Code and Court: Where They Stand and Where They're Going, 30 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L. L. 375, 382-390 (1992); William N. Gianaris, The New World Order and the Need for an
International Criminal Court, 16 FORDHAM INT'L. L. J. 88, 92-98 (1992); M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Time
Has Come for an International Criminal Court, 1 IND. INT'L. & COMP. L. REv. 1, 2-11 (1991); M. Cherif
Bassiouni, The Penal Characteristics of Conventional International Criminal Law, 15 CASE W. RES. J.
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establishing a permanent institution to prosecute the most egregious violations of
international criminal law culminated with the formation of the International
Criminal Court ("ICC"). 9 4 The Rome Statute, which came into force during the
summer of 2002, includes four categories of offenses: the crime of genocide,
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression.95 The ICC
prosecutes these categories of offenses because they violate fundamental humani-
tarian principles and constitute the most serious crimes of international
concern.
96
The Twentieth Century demonstrated the harsh reality that the global commu-
nity failed to create a mechanism to enforce international humanitarian law.
Most violations of the established norms of international behavior, such as the
crime of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, are committed with
the complicity of the state and its leadership.97 The Hague Conventions of 1899
and 1907 were the first significant codifications of the laws of war in an interna-
tional treaty. 98 However, these Conventions failed to create a permanent interna-
tional criminal court with jurisdiction transcending national boundaries, primarily
because sovereign nations were unwilling to be bound by the judgments of an
international judicial authority.99 The United States, for example, persistently
claimed that it "reserved the right to resolve any purely American issue." 1°
Between 1946 and 1996, the United Nations led the efforts to codify certain
international crimes.10' Immediately after the Second World War, the United
States sponsored Resolution 95(I), which recognized the principles of interna-
tional law contained in the Nuremberg Charter.10 2 In 1947, the United Nations
General Assembly ("GA") directed the International Law Commission ("ILC")
to formulate the principles of international law in a draft code of offenses, while
a special rapporteur was assigned to formulate the Draft Statute for the Establish-
ment of the International Criminal Court. 10 3 While many nations supported the
establishment of a permanent international criminal court, it was clear that none
INT'L. L. 27, 33-34 (1983); Vespasian Pella, Towards an International Criminal Court, 44 AM. J. INT'L.
L. 37, 41-42 (1950); Georg Schwarzenberger, The Problem of an International Criminal Law, 3 CUR-
Rrr LEGAL PRoB. 263, 264 (1950).
94 See International Criminal Court: About the Court, http://www.icc-cpi.int/about.html (last visited
Jan. 19, 2006).
95 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 5(1), July 7, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/
9, available at http://www.un.orgllawlicclstatute/99_corr/cstatute.htm [hereinafter Rome Statute].
96 See International Criminal Court: About the Court, supra note 94.
97 BENJAmirN B. FERENCZ, NEW LEGAL FOUNDATIONS FOR GLOBAL SURVIVAL: SECURITY THROUGH
THE SECURITY COUNCIL 67 (1994).
98 Id. at 1-2.
99 BALL, supra note 92, at 16.
100 Id.
101 M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, in 1
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 293, (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2d ed. 1999).
102 Id.
103 Id. at 293-94.
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of the world's superpowers were ready to support the establishment of an interna-
tional criminal court." °4
Various draft reports were produced between the 1950s and 1980s, but it was
not until 1989 that the GA was faced again with the question of an international
criminal court when Trinidad and Tobago sought to address international drug
trafficking. 10 5 The ILC persevered in developing the limited 1989 mandate re-
lated to illicit drug trafficking, which eventually evolved into the Draft Statute
for an International Criminal Court. 106 It was this draft that served as the basis
for the GA's decision to establish the ad hoc Committee on the Establishment of
an International Criminal Court and later the Preparatory Committee for the Es-
tablishment of an International Criminal Court. 107
On July 17, 1998, the Rome Statute was adopted at the UN Diplomatic Con-
ference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court. 10 8 Of the more than 150 nations in attendance, 120 voted in favor of the
court, and 7 against, with 21 abstentions. 10 9 As of May 12, 2005, ninety-nine
nations, not including Rwanda, have ratified the treaty and thus became parties to
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 110
There are two primary reasons why states have elected not to ratify the ICC
Statute. First, countries that do not value democracy and human rights, like
China and the Sudan, have little or no incentive to cede criminal jurisdiction to
an international entity whose primary offenses address human rights viola-
tions."1 By ceding jurisdiction to the ICC, they would potentially be turning
over their own nationals for prosecution before the international community.
Second, states that purport to value human rights, like the United States, argue
that their sovereignty is better protected by rejecting the Court than by joining
it.112 This is a clear paradox, for those states that purport to value human rights
have the greatest incentive to promote an institution dedicated to the realization
of international peace. In the case of Rwanda, the refusal to ratify the Rome
Statute was philosophical. Capital punishment is not an eligible sanction for any
offense falling under the subject matter jurisdiction of the ICC. The maximum
104 Id. at 295.
105 Id. at 295-99.
106 Id. at 301.
107 Id.
108 Press Release, U.N. Diplomatic Conference Concludes in Rome with Decision to Establish Perma-
nent International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. L/ROM/22 (July 17, 1998), available at http://www.un.org/
icc/pressrel/lrom22.htm.
109 Id.
110 The International Criminal Court: The States Parties to the Rome Statute, http://www.icc-cpi.int/
asp/statesparties.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2006).
111 Michele Caianiello & Giulio Illuminati, From the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia to the International Criminal Court, 26 N.C. J. INTL. LAW & COM. REG. 407
112 See Diane Marie Amann & M.N.S. Sellers, The United States of America and the International
Criminal Court, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 381, 385-86 (2002); see also Scheffer, supra note 93, at 17-19
(discussing the flaws the United States saw in the statute).
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punishment permitted by the Rome Statute is life imprisonment.1 13 Because
Rwanda favored the death penalty for convicted genocidal perpetrators, they de-
clined to recognize the Court's jurisdiction.1 14
There are four significant jurisdictional components to the Rome Statute.
First, the Rome Statute entered into force on July 1, 2002.115 This means that
only acts perpetrated after July 1, 2002 are eligible for prosecution. Second, all
nations that are party to the Rome Statute must accept its jurisdiction. 116 This is
the cornerstone of a cooperative, international legal community. Third, states
that have not ratified the Statute may, by special declaration, accept the tempo-
rary jurisdiction of the ICC for crimes covered by its subject matter jurisdic-
tion. 117 Finally, the Court can exercise jurisdiction if a SC referral is made to the
prosecutor. 118
The subject matter jurisdiction of the ICC includes four categories of of-
fenses: 119 the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the
crime of aggression. 120 The definition of genocide articulated in the ICC Statute
follows the definition in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide.1 21 Crimes against humanity include enslavement,122 depor-
tation or forcible transfer of population, 123 torture, 124 the crime of apartheid, 125
and other acts "committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed
against any civilian population." 126 War crimes include any of the following acts
against persons or property protected under the Geneva Conventions: torture or
inhumane treatment,' 27 taking of hostages, 128 intentionally directing attacks
against civilian populations that are not part of the hostilities, 129 killing or
wounding a combatant who has surrendered, 130 pillaging, 131 using asphyxiating
113 Rome Statute, supra note 95, art. 77(1)(b).
114 MELVERN, supra note 31, at 249.
115 Rome Statute, supra note 95, art.11(1).
116 Id. art. 12(1).
117 Id. art. 12(3).
118 id. art. 13(b).
119 Id. art. 5(1).
120 Id.; see also id. art. 5(2) (which states that while aggression falls under the subject matter jurisdic-
tion of the ICC, a definition of the crime must be finalized before jurisdiction can be exercised).
121 Id. art. 6.
122 Rome Statute, supra note 95, art. 7(1)(c).
123 Id. art. 7(l)(d).
124 Id. art. 7(1)(f).
125 Id. art. 7(1)0).
126 Id. art. 7(1).
127 Id. art. 8(2)(a)(ii).
128 Id. art. 8(2)(a)(viii).
129 Id. art. 8(2)(b)(i).
130 Id. art. 8(2)(b)(vi).
131 Id. art. 8(2)(b)(xvi).
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gases, 13 2 sexual slavery and forced sterilization. 133 The Court will have jurisdic-
tion over the crime of aggression after it has been formally defined. 134
It is also important to note that the ICC will not operate on the basis of pri-
mary jurisdiction, but will be subject to the principle of complementarity. 135 The
principle of complementarity provides that the ICC will exercise jurisdiction only
when a national judicial system is unable to investigate or prosecute transgres-
sors. 136 In other words, the ICC is a subsidiary mechanism to handle the prose-
cution of crimes within its jurisdiction. Some states, fearing the possibility of
sham investigations or trials protecting perpetrators, argue that the Court should
go further and intervene where a national judicial system would be ineffective or
unavailable. 137
To date, four cases have been referred to the Office of the Prosecutor. The
state parties themselves referred three of these situations-in the Republic of
Uganda on January 29, 2004,138 the Democratic Republic of Congo on April 19,
2004,139 and the Central African Republic January 7, 2005.140 The fourth situa-
tion in Darfur, Sudan was referred by the Security Council on March 30, 2005.141
Of these four, the Prosecutor initiated investigations into the situations in the
DRC on June 23, 2004142 and in the Republic of Uganda on July 29, 2004.143
V. Discussion
Prison overcrowding is a significant concern for criminal justice officials and
policymakers across the world. It has been shown to cause increased arousal and
132 Id. art. 8(2)(b)(xviii).
133 Id. art. 8(2)(e)(vi).
134 Id. art. 5(2).
135 Id. arts. 17, 18.
136 John T. Holmes, The Principle of Complementarity, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATuTE-IssUEs, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 41, 42 (Roy S. K. Leed ed.,
Kluwer Law Int'l 1999).
137 Id.
138 Press Release, International Criminal Court, President of Uganda Refers Situation Concerning
Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) to the ICC, http://www.icc-cpi.int/pressreleasedetails&id=16&l=en.
html (last visited Jan. 19, 2006).
139 Press Release, International Criminal Court, Prosecutor Receives Referral of the Situation in the
Democratic Republic of Congo, http://www.icc-cpi.int/pressreleasedetails&id= 19.html (last visited Jan.
19, 2006).
140 Press Release, International Criminal Court, Prosecutor Receives Referral Concerning Central Af-
rican Republic, http://www.icc-cpi.int/pressrelease_details&id=87.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2006).
141 S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005).
142 Press Release, International Criminal Court, The Office of the Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Court Opens its First Investigation, http://www.icc-cpi.int/pressrelease-details&id=26&1=en.
html (last visited Jan. 19, 2006).
143 Press Release, International Criminal Court, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court Opens
an Investigation into Northern Uganda, http://www.icc-cpi.int/pressreleasedetails&id=33&l=en.html
(last visited Jan. 19, 2006).
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stress among inmates, 144 inmate illness complaints, 145 violence and disciplinary
problems, 146 resentment among correctional officers, 147 and homicide1 48 among
inmates. Several approaches to overcrowding have been implemented, including
the construction of larger facilities, 149 diversion programs for non-violent offend-
ers, 150 and the release of offenders back into the community earlier than their
sentences have warranted.15' The Supreme Court of the United States has also
weighed in on prison overcrowding. In Rhodes v. Chapman, the Court ruled that
the housing of two inmates in a single cell did not violate the Eighth Amend-
ment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.152 While in Wilson v.
Seiter, in addition to tightening the requirements needed to prove cruel and unu-
sual punishment, the Court held that inmates must prove deliberate indifference
on the part of prison officials to succeed with an Eighth Amendment claim.1 53
When determining what might constitute an appropriate strategy for reducing
prison overcrowding, it is critical to distinguish between types of offenders. For
non-violent offenders or offenders with substance abuse or mental health
problems, diversion programs have had positive results. 154 There is also a dis-
tinction between offenders awaiting trial and offenders who have already served
part or most of their sentence. Offenders in the latter classification have been
formally punished by the criminal justice system for the crimes they committed.
144 See Claire Lawrence & Kathryn Andrews, The Influence of Perceived Prison Overcrowding on
Male Inmates' Perception of Aggressive Events, 30 AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR 273, 281 (2004); Frank J.
Porporino, Managing Violent Individuals in Correctional Settings, 1 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 213,
229-30 (1986); Verne C. Cox, Paul B. Paulus, & Garvin McCain, Prison Crowding Research: The Rele-
vance for Prison Housing Standards and a General Approach Regarding Crowding Phenomena, 39 AM.
PSYCHOL. 1148, 1156 (1984); Paul B. Paulus & Garvin McCain, Crowding in Jails, 4 BASIC & APPLIED
SOC. PSYCHOL. 89, 105 (1983).
145 Garvin McCain, Verne C. Cox, & Paul B. Paulus, The Relationship Between Illness Complaints
and Degree of Crowding in a Prison Environment, 8 ENv'T. & BEHAV. 283, 288 (1976).
146 D. Farrington, & C. Nuttal, Prison Size, Overcrowding, Prison Violence and Recidivism, 8 J.
CRIM. JUST. 221, 230 (1980).
147 See Helsingin Sanomat, Prison Overcrowding Source of Stress for Inmates and Guards, http:II
www.helsinginsanomat.fi/english/article/Prison+overcrowding+source+of+stress+for+inmates+and+
guards%OD%0A/1 101981260600 (last visited Jan. 19, 2006).
148 George B. Palermo, Mark T. Palermo & Douglas J. Simpson, Death by Inmate: Multiple Murder
in a Maximum Security Prison, 40 INT'L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIM. 181, 182 (1996).
149 Thomas B. Marvell, Is Further Prison Expansion Worth the Costs?, FED. PROBATION, Dec. 1994,
at 59; P.L. Dressel .... and We Keep on Building Prisons: Racism, Poverty, and Challenges to the
Welfare State, 21 J. Soc. & Soc. WELFARE 7 (1994)
150 DEAN CHAMPION, CORRECTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, A CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 109
(Pearson/Prentice Hall, 4th ed. 2004).
151 Id.
152 Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981).
153 Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 301 (1991).
154 Henry J. Steadman & Michelle Naples, Assessing the Effectiveness of Jail Diversion Programs for
Persons with Serious Mental Illness and Co-Occurring Substance Use Disorders, 23 BEHAV. Sci. & L.
163, 168 (2005); M. Alexis Kennedy, Carolin Klein, Boris B. Gorzalka, & John C. Yuille, Attitude
Change Following a Diversion Program for Men Who Solicit Sex, 41 J. OFFENDER REHAB. 41, 58 (2004);
Cassia Spohn, R.K. Piper, T. Martin, & E.D. Frenzel, Drug Courts and Recidivism: The Results of an
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149, 150-176 (2001).
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They are convicted offenders, and theories of deterrence and retribution have, to
a significant degree, been implicated. In contrast, offenders incarcerated pre-trial
have not been subjected to formal sanctioning, and theories of deterrence and
retribution have not been implicated.
The release of suspected genocidal perpetrators fails both the Rwandan and
international communities on three levels. First, the strength of the Genocide
Convention is compromised. If genocide is indeed one of the most reprehensible
crimes that can be committed, 155 then all persons accused of participating in
genocidal events should be brought to justice. While "justice" does not necessa-
rily mean convictions and incarceration, the timely initiation of a criminal trial
would certainly suffice. Practical problems inherent to correctional facilities, like
overcrowding, should not hinder the need to prosecute those accused of having
orchestrated or perpetrated genocidal events.
Second, the domestic trials were originally actualized because Rwandan offi-
cials believed that justice and reconciliation could only be served if the accused
were prosecuted and judged by Rwandan society.' 5 6 Not only does the release of
suspected offenders fail to accomplish the goals of justice and reconciliation, but
it compromises the legitimacy of Rwanda's criminal justice process. Moreover,
released offenders will likely return to the communities where the atrocities were
committed. Without a formal resolution to the genocidal campaigns, Rwanda's
national security is likely to be jeopardized and the reintegration of the accused
will be considerably more difficult.157
Third, future acts of genocide cannot be prevented if perpetrators are permitted
to elude responsibility for their crimes. On April 7, 2004, in a speech commemo-
rating the tenth anniversary of the Rwanda genocide, UN Secretary General Kofi
Annan announced the Five Point Action Plan to Prevent Genocide.1 58 The first
point was prevention of armed conflict which usually provides the context for
genocide; second, protection of civilians in armed conflict including a mandate
for UN peacekeepers to protect civilians; third, ending impunity through judicial
action in both national and international courts; fourth, information gathering and
early warning through a UN Special Advisor for Genocide Prevention; and fifth,
swift and decisive action along a continuum of steps, including military action.159
155 See generally ROMtO A. DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL: THE FAILURE OF HUMANITY
IN RWANDA (2004); WILLIAM HEWrr, DEFINING THE HORRIFIC: READINGS ON GENOCIDE AND HOLO-
CAUST IN THE 20TH CENTURY (Pearson Edu. 2003); KURT JONASSOHN, GENOCIDE AND GROSS HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1998); GEORGE J. ANDREOPOULOS, GENOCIDE: CON-
CEPTUAL AND HISTORICAL DIMENSIONS (1994); ISRAEL W. CHARNY & CHANAN RAPAPORT, How CAN
WE COMMIT THE UNTHINKABLE? GENOCIDE, THE HUMAN CANCER (1982).
156 WISE ET AL., supra note 24, at 540.
157 See generally Carter Hay, An Exploratory Test of Braithwaite's Reintegrative Shaming Theory, 38
J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 132, 133-34 (2001); JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME & REINTEGRATION 1-
15 (1989) (arguing that the key to crime control is cultural commitments to shaming that is re-
integrative).
158 Press Release, United Nations, Secretary-General Observes International Day of Reflection on
1994 Rwanda Genocide, http://www2.unog.ch/news2/documents/newsen/sgO4OO3e.htm (last visited
Nov. 2, 2005).
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His third point affirmed comments by leading scholars that future acts of geno-
cide are best deterred by the prosecution of suspected perpetrators. 160
The world community has already witnessed the aftermath of failed prosecu-
tions of genocidal perpetrators. The Cambodian genocide is a prime example of
inadequate international criminal justice. The Khmer Rouge, headed by Pol Pot,
gained control of Cambodia in April of 1975.161 Although most Cambodians
welcomed the new regime, the initial enthusiasm faded as the Khmer Rouge be-
gan to institute some of the most radical policies ever experienced by a post-
revolutionary nation. 162 Within days of its victory, the Khmer Rouge began
evacuating the country's major cities. 163 Money was abolished and symbols of
Western technology, such as automobiles and refrigerators, were destroyed. 164
The Khmer Rouge severed contact with the outside world, cutting off interna-
tional telephone lines, telegrams, and international mail service. 165
Between 1975 and 1979, the Pol Pot regime systematically subjected the
Cambodian population to forced labor, starvation, and murder. 166 The genocide
in Cambodia was perpetrated against three categories of victims: religious
groups, ethnic groups, and a part of the majority national group. 167 During Pol
Pot's effort to remold society, eradicate individualism, and create "total commu-
nism," Cambodia was subjected to what was likely the world's most radical po-
litical, social, and economic revolution. 168 As Kiernan affirmed, "the country
was cut off from the outside world; ... schools and hospitals were closed; ...
families were separated; ... and one and a half million of its nearly eight million
people were starved to death or massacred."' 69
Three decades later, the international community still thirsts for justice for the
Khmer Rouge atrocities. 170 In 2003, the UN and Cambodia drafted an agreement
160 Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future Atroci-
ties?, 95 AM. J. INT'L. L. 7, 12 (2001); Helen Fein, Introduction to GENOCIDE WATCH 14 (Helen Fein ed.,
1992); LEO KUPER, THE PREVENTION OF GENOCIDE 101-02 (1985).
161 Kiernan, supra note 29, at 191.
162 See ELIZABETH BECKER, WHEN THE WAR WAS OVER 178 (Simon & Schuster 1986).
163 Id. at 176.
164 Id. at 182, 184.
165 Id. at 180.
166 Kiernan, supra note 29, at 191.
167 Id. at 197-202.
168 Id. at 191.
169 Id.
170 See Daniel K. Donovan, Joint U.N.-Cambodia Efforts to Establish a Khmer Rouge Tribunal, 44
HARv. lNT'L. L. J. 551, 575 (2003); Mann Bunyanunda, The Khmer Rouge on Trial: Whither the De-
fense, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1581, 1583 (2001); Jaya Ramji, Reclaiming Cambodian History: The Case for
a Truth Commission, 24 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 137, 138 (2000); Theresa Klosterman, The Feasibility
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Khmer Rouge Leadership, 6 ILSA J. INT'L. & COMp. L. 507 (2000)
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to convene a Khmer Rouge tribunal.1 71 Though no trials have yet begun, ap-
proval by the GA effectively cleared the way for an international tribunal. The
efforts made by the Cambodian government and the international community to
bring genocidal perpetrators to justice were significant, not only for the political
stability of Cambodia, but also for the legitimacy of the international criminal
law regime. The fact that international legal scholars and government officials
worked for three decades to secure some resolution to the genocide in Cambodia
suggests how important a resolution must be. A curious irony befalls us when
persons work for decades to secure some justice for Cambodian victims, while
others dismantle the redress in Rwanda for the sake of easing prison
overcrowding.
There are six potential solutions to the prison overcrowding dilemma currently
faced by the Rwandan government, each with various advantages and disadvan-
tages. First, government officials could release non-genocide-related offenders
from prison whose crimes were innocuous or whose sentences are close to com-
pletion. This is not a novel idea,172 and it would continue to secure the most
violent convicts and genocidal detainees. Given finite prison space, this alterna-
tive offers economic pragmatism and is consistent with recent efforts at penal
reform.
Second, a plea bargaining system could be instituted for Category Four of-
fenders. For those genocidal detainees whose prison sentences would not be sig-
nificant or whose sanction would involve immediate release into the community,
the reliance on plea bargaining would provide legitimate dispositions for what
could potentially be thousands of cases.
Third, additional prisons can be built. While this is not an inexpensive solu-
tion, it can address problems related to capacity relatively expeditiously. Given
the hundreds of millions of dollars expended to date by the United Nations for
creating and sustaining the ICTR,173 funds for new prison construction would
likely pale in comparison, and may also assist Rwanda's economy with an influx
of perdurable employment.
Fourth, other nations can assume the prosecutions of the offenders. Because
the Rwandan detainees have been charged with violating the Genocide Conven-
tion, other nations can intervene based on the principle of universal jurisdiction,
which permits states to assume jurisdiction over those offenses that are so egre-
gious to mankind (e.g., genocide) that custody of the offender is enough. 174 Un-
like the principles of territoriality (jurisdiction over criminal acts committed
within a state's territory), 75 nationality (jurisdiction over a state's own nation-
171 Press Release, United Nations, General Assembly Approves Draft Agreement between U.N., Cam-
bodia on Khmer Rouge Trials, U.N. Doec. GA/10135, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/gal0135.
doc.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2006).
172 Marvell, supra note 149, at 61.
173 Yacoubian, supra note 66, at 137.
174 WISE ET AL., supra note 24, at 62-63; Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under Interna-
tional Law, 66 TEx. L. Rav. 785, 836 (1988).
175 WISE ET AL., supra note 24, at 47-51; Randall, supra note 174, at 836.
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als), 176 or passive personality (jurisdiction if the crime's victims are nationals of
the state), 177 the principle of universality focuses on the category of offenses.
While the assumption of jurisdiction over genocidal events committed more than
a decade ago is neither a logistically straightforward nor inexpensive task, it is
certainly within the realm of possibility that more stable nations could assume
responsibility for the prosecution of some of these crimes.
Fifth, the ICTR could assume jurisdiction. While the logistical and pecuniary
capabilities of the ICTR are already strained,1 78 the ICTR could assume jurisdic-
tion over Category One offenders to assure that the most serious offenses are
tried before a competent tribunal with considerable experience prosecuting geno-
cide-related offenses.
Sixth, the proceedings in Rwanda could continue at their current pace until
2009, at which time the Rome Statute becomes eligible for revision. Article 123
of the Rome Statute calls for its review seven years after entry into force. 179 This
means that the ICC could assume jurisdiction of the Rwandan genocide prosecu-
tions even though the Statute went into force during the summer of 2002, eight
years after the crimes were committed.' 80 Such a retroactive revision would
"guarantee lasting respect for and the enforcement of international justice."'18'
Given the inconceivable alternative of releasing accused genocidal perpetrators, a
temporary revision of the Rome Statute to accommodate prosecutions of the
Rwandan genocide seems appropriate.
Genocide is distinguishable from all other crimes by the motivation behind it.
Toward the end of the Second World War, when the full horror of the Third
Reich was revealed, Winston Churchill stated that the world was being con-
fronted with a "crime that has no name."' 82 Indeed, history was of little use in
finding a recognized word to fit the nature of Nazi Germany's crime. With the
possible exception of the Armenian Massacres of 1915,183 there simply were no
precedents with respect to either the nature or the degree of this crime.
While the prosecution of 80,000 suspected genocidal perpetrators is a colossal
undertaking, the solution currently being undertaken by the Rwandan Govern-
ment is ineffective and incomprehensible. What effectively amounts to a general
pardon for suspected genocidal victimizers is inconsistent with what presumably
is the foundation of international criminal law-that the most pernicious offend-
ers are found criminally responsible for their actions before a tribunal recognized
by the world community. The lessons learned by the release of genocidal detain-
ees are dangerous ones. Persons committed to the rule of law should not be
176 WISE ET AL., supra note 24, at 51-53.
177 Id. at 59-62.
178 Yacoubian, supra note 66, at 138.
179 Rome Statute, supra note 95, art. 123(1).
180 Id. art. 11(1).
181 Id. Preamble.
182 Jack N. Porter, Introduction to GENOCIDE AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A GLOBAL ANTHOLOGY 2, 5
(Univ. Press of America 1982).
183 DADRIAN, supra note 7, at 302-05.
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disheartened that the international criminal justice system is incapable of address-
ing the prosecutorial needs for the type of crime it was created to litigate. Poten-
tial perpetrators, in turn, can take comfort in the knowledge that if their genocidal
campaigns are implemented by enough persons and on a large enough scale, the
global community will be ill-equipped to address the legal ramifications.
Conclusion
As the international criminal enterprise increases in both scope and severity, it
is the responsibility of the global community as a whole to develop adequate
legal protections against these transgressions. There can be no dispute that con-
sistent enforcement of the Genocide Convention is imperative to the deliverance
of international criminal justice. Close to a decade after the horrors of 1994, the
ICTR and the domestic prosecutions have not been particularly successful in
their mandate to prosecute the accused and punish the guilty. In 1946, the GA
recognized that the denial of the right to existence of entire human groups
"shocks the conscience of mankind, results in great losses to humanity in the
form of cultural and other contributions represented by these human groups, and
is contrary to moral law and to the spirit and aims of the United Nations."' 184
Today, genocide is generally recognized as the paramount violation of interna-
tional criminal law. As such, enforcement of the Genocide Convention should be
shouldered by all nation-states. Because the ICC cannot yet assume jurisdiction,
it is strongly recommended that states step forward and provide national prosecu-
tions for those offenses that constitute the "most serious crimes of concern to the
international community as a whole."' 185
184 G.A. Res. 96, U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1 (Dec. 11, 1947).
185 Rome Statute, supra note 95, art. 5(1).
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